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Abstract
We compute actuarially fair contribution rates (aggregating both employers’
and employees’ contributions) for the USS pension scheme, using UK life tables
and market yield curves. The fair rate is sensitive to life expectancy and the
level of real yields, neither of which appears stationary. So any scheme predicated
on a constant contribution rate is inherently unstable. We therefore argue that,
to survive, defined benefit schemes such as USS must explicitly incorporate time
variation in contribution rates, ideally along with some dependence on individual
characteristics. Our formulae in principle provide an objective, verifiable and
implementable methodology to calculate such fair contribution rates.
∗All at Department of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, Birkbeck, University of London,
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1 Introduction
In May 2018, UK universities and trade unions agreed to set up an expert panel to
consider what, if any, changes were required to the existing defined benefit scheme, the
Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS), expressing the hope that “... the expert
panel’s deliberations will lead to... a defined benefit scheme which is sustainable and
aﬀordable...” (USS, May 2018). In this paper we consider whether this objective is
achievable.
The USS scheme, like any defined benefit scheme, makes a set of promises to its
members. These can be summarised in terms of four components:1
1. For a scheme member who has  years until retirement, and stays in the scheme,
USS will progressively accumulate a liability to pay a pension equal to 1
75
of their
salary for each year they2 contribute to the scheme,3 for the remainder of their
lifetime. This pension is (more or less) indexed to the cost of living.4 So someone
who contributes for example  = 20 years will get a pension equal to 20
75
= 267%
of their average salary over the 20 years.
2. USS also pays a lump sum at retirement, equal to 3 additional years’ worth of
pension.
3. After the member’s death the scheme will continue to pay 50% of the pension to
1Note that USS also has a defined contribution element for some scheme members; this paper however
focuses solely on the defined benefit components.
2Throughout the paper we use the term “they” in the singular, gender-neutral sense.
3This was previously 180 , until 2016.
4There are exclusion clauses which introduce partial indexation if inflation exceeds some critical
level. We assume that the impact of this partial indexation is minimal, and therefore ignore it in our
analysis.
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any surviving spouse or civil partner.5
4. Finally, the scheme oﬀers a death-in-service grant of 3 times annual salary at the
time of death.
In order for the scheme to be just viable, the typical scheme member must pay just
enough into the scheme, as a deduction from salary, to fund the payouts the scheme will
expect to make. These contributions are made both by the employer and the employee,
but since both are taken out of the gross salary cost of employing the scheme member,
we simply consider the total amount, rather than who pays it. The “actuarially fair”
contribution rate, which we refer to as ∗, is then the rate of total contributions, as a
percentage of salary, that ensures this is the case.
Technically speaking, this requires that the present value of contributions into the
scheme must match the present value of the scheme’s liabilities. In order to calculate
these present values we need to take account of the nature of the risk (or lack of it)
associated with both inflows and outflows to the scheme. However, this is all we need to
know: specifically we do not need to know the investment policies of the scheme, since
these have no impact on these present value calculations.
The exact calculation of the fair contribution rate is quite complicated. In the main
body of the paper we carry out this task in a range of environments of varying degrees
of complexity. However, we can get quite a long way by first doing the calculation for
what might appear to be a highly restricted special case, but which turns out to have
a surprising degree of empirical relevance. This special case has the advantage that it
is easy to present in non-technical terms, so we start by presenting this as an example,
before summarising the key features of our results. We then proceed to the technical
details.
5There is also some limited provision for pensions to be paid to dependent children, but these are
time-limited and discretionary so we exclude these from our analysis.
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1.1 The suitcase calculation
Imagine a world in which both inflation and growth of salaries in nominal terms were
precisely zero, as was the nominal rate of interest. By implication growth of salaries in
real terms would also be zero, as would be the real interest rate. Not only does this
simplify the calculation considerably, but - despite its highly restrictive assumptions, it
turns out to provide a very relevant benchmark case.
In this highly simplified hypothetical case, we can do some very simple and intuitive
illustrative calculations. Consider the example of a 27 year old who joins the scheme
and continues to contribute until retirement at the age of 67. At this point, the scheme
is committed to pay the first three benefits listed above.6 On current historic UK data
for life expectancy, at this point the typical scheme member (averaging across genders)
can expect to live until the age of 85, so a further 18 years. So, for the average scheme
member the scheme will expect to pay 40
75
= 533% of their career average salary for 18
years. (Of course not all scheme members will stay in the scheme for so long, but we
show below that in this simple case this does not aﬀect the fair contribution rate).
On top of this the scheme will need to pay the lump sum equal to three years of
pension, which (in this simplified case) has an identical eﬀect to the scheme member
living for 3 extra years. Finally, the promise to continue to pay half the pension to
a surviving spouse also has an impact that is equivalent to an increase in the scheme
member’s life expectancy. Assuming that there is roughly a 50% chance that the spouse
will outlive the scheme member,7 and that the spouse will live for a further six years
(again, roughly in line with the data), this is equivalent to an increase in the scheme
member’s life expectancy of 1
2
× 1
2
× 6 = 15 years. So we can simplify by ignoring items
6In this example we are thus neglecting the contributions required to fund the death-in-service grant.
We show below that when we calculate the contribution of this element to the fair contribution rate it
plays a very small role. This is unsurprising since if the death-in-service grant were itself actuarially fair
- ie, if it was simply equal to the present value of benefits accrued up to that date - then it would have
no impact at all on the contribution rate. In practice it increases the fair contribution rate somewhat,
implying that the amount paid out is more than fair value for the typical member.
7The probability is in fact somewhat less than 50%, since we are conditioning on the scheme member
surviving to 67 (since the spouse may not survive to that point) but we ignore this for expositional
simplicity. Using the ONS figures for 2015− 17, the actual probability is 458%.
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2 and 3, and simply considering the cost to the scheme of paying the pension to someone
with an “eﬀective life expectancy” of 18 + 3 + 15 = 225 years.
A calculation of the fair contribution rate in this simple case reduces to the require-
ment that the cumulative total payments made by the scheme member must be enough
to pay for the benefits the scheme expects to pay. Under the restrictive assumptions
given above, this is equivalent to the scheme member simply putting some fixed share,
 of their salary into a suitcase until retirement, and then handing the suitcase over
to the scheme to pay their pension. The cash in the suitcase may be too much or too
little for any individual pensioner - the scheme pools the risk that some members will
die early or late - but an actuarially fair contribution rate ensures that on average there
will be just enough money in the suitcase to pay the benefits the scheme promises to
the average scheme member.
We shall refer to the fair contribution rate for the suitcase calculation as ∗. In the
case of our example of someone who stays in the scheme for 40 years, with an “eﬀective
life expectancy” at retirement (as defined above) of 22.5 years we must have
total payments into the suitcase = total expected payments out of the suitcase
fair contribution rate∗ × salary×
time in scheme
40 =
pension
40
75
× salary×
eﬀective life expectancy at retirement
225
Here the salary refers to career average salary. Simplifying this expression gives,
∗ = 22575 = 30%
i.e., in this special case we can think of the fair contribution rate just in terms of a ratio
of years: the top of the ratio is the eﬀective number of years the pension will on average
need to be paid, and 75 is the notional number of years a scheme member would need
to contribute to receive a pension exactly equal to their average salary. Furthermore,
note that because both salary and time to retirement, , cancel out, it means that in
this special case they have no impact on the fair contribution rate: ∗ is the same at all
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salaries and for any length of time in the scheme.
While the suitcase calculation requires some drastic simplifying assumptions, we shall
show that it provides a very helpful benchmark under much more general conditions.
1.2 The suitcase becomes a bank account
Indeed our first adjustment towards more realistic assumptions turns out to make ab-
solutely no diﬀerence at all to the answer. Consider a somewhat more realistic case
where inflation is typically positive, so that cash left in a suitcase would progressively
lose value in real terms. But money regularly paid into a deposit account (which we need
to assume is completely risk-free, hence has a government guarantee) accrues interest.
If we assumed that the nominal interest rate on such an account was precisely equal to
the inflation rate, then the real interest rate would be precisely zero.
In this special case any contribution paid into the bank account would maintain its
value in real terms, so total payments into such a deposit account would simply equal
the contribution rate times total salary over the period that the scheme member pays
into the account, expressed in real terms. Such payments may increase over the working
life, if they get promoted, or at least move up their salary scale, but in this special case,
the pattern of salary over time is irrelevant: all that matters is the total amount paid
in, in real terms. For a scheme member contributing for 40 years, the pension payments
out of the scheme are calculated as 40
75
of average salary, and are also guaranteed in real
terms. But this pension obligation is in turn simply equal to 1
75
× total real earnings
while they are in the scheme. We can then repeat the calculation of the fair contribution
rate for the bank account case, ∗ as
total real payments in = total expected real payments out
fair contribution rate∗ × total earnings =
pension
1
75
× total earnings×
eﬀective life expectancy at retirement
225
which gives exactly the same answer, i.e.: ∗ = ∗ = 22575 = 30% In this case it is
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transparent that, with a zero real interest rate, the amount of time in the scheme,
and any real growth of earnings, are both irrelevant to this calculation.8 The suitcase
calculation above still applies exactly, and we can again think of the fair contribution
rate solely in terms of a ratio of years. Furthermore the amended version of the formula
makes it clear that we do not need to assume that the scheme member stays in the scheme
throughout their working life, since a shorter period of contributions aﬀects both sides
of the formula symmetrically.9
The extreme simplicity of the suitcase calculation immediately brings out a key
feature of the fair contribution rate: for a given accrual rate for the pension (i.e., holding
the notional number of years constant at 75), and for a given retirement date, the fair
contribution rate must increase with eﬀective life expectancy. This feature is always
present even when we consider much more complicated cases.10
Figure 1 shows that, roughly from the start of the twentieth century onwards, there
have been steady rises in UK life expectancy at age 65, with nontrivial diﬀerences by
gender.
8In the more general case we show below that ∗ is barely aﬀected by real growth of wages during
the lifetime. In contrast, calculating the pension on the basis of the final salary (as was the case for
pre-2016 version of the scheme) raises the fair contribution rate nontrivially (see discussion in Section
3.3 below).
9This feature also holds, to a fairly good approximation, even in more complex cases: the member
can be assumed to quit the scheme randomly, with minimal, if any, impact on the contribution rate.
See discussion in Section 3.4 below.
10Only in the resrictive case of the suitcase calculation is it precisely proportional to life expectancy
at retirement..
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Figure 1: UK Life Expectancy at Age 65
The only way that such rises would not impact on the fair contribution rate would
be if the age of retirement within the scheme adjusted automatically by precisely enough
to oﬀset the impact of rising life expectancy. While retirement ages have risen they have
not risen enough to do so. Thus the clear implication is that on this basis alone, fair
contribution rates should be on a secular upward trend.
Despite its simplicity, and the apparently restrictive assumptions made in deriving
the suitcase calculation, it turns out to provide a very useful, and empirically relevant
benchmark case, when we turn to consider the impact of real interest rates not being
equal to zero.
1.3 The fair contribution rate when real interest rates are not
zero
1.3.1 A general definition of the fair contribution rate
The calculation of the fair contribution rate is in general more complicated than in the
suitcase calculation because we need to compare amounts in present value terms, i.e. for
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the general case we calculate, for any given scheme member the fair contribution rate,
∗ that equates the present value of payments into the scheme to the present value of
scheme liabilities to the scheme member, i.e. that satisfies
∗ × (present value of salary payments) = present value of liabilities
which in turn requires
∗ = present value of liabilities
present value of salary payments
1.3.2 Which discount rate?
As is the case whenever we calculate a present value, we need to pick an appropriate rate
at which to discount both future payments into the scheme and the scheme’s liabilities.
We assume that the appropriate interest rate to use is a real interest rate on bonds of
an appropriate maturity that are free of both default risk and inflation risk: thus in our
calculations we use yields on index-linked UK government bonds.11
We argue that if anything this may result in an under- rather than over-estimate of
the fair contribution rate, since the use of a risk-free discount rate is more obviously
applicable to scheme liabilities than it is to contributions.
There are two distinct rationales for the use of such risk-free rates in calculating the
present value of liabilities.
The first rationale arises from a standard assumption in the analysis of insurance
markets. Liabilities to any individual scheme member are risky, from the scheme’s point
of view, since they depend on the member’s date of death, which is unknown. But a
standard assumption in insurance is that the law of large numbers applies, such that for
payments to a large number of scheme members with the same mortality risk, individual
risks cancel each other out, so that aggregate payments are close to risk-free.
11We discuss below one adjustment that is required to these yields for the fact that scheme liabilities
are indexed to CPI rather than RPI inflation.
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An alternative rationale, which is arguably more widely applicable, focuses on the
nature of mortality risk at the individual level. In standard finance theory, it is not risk,
per se that matters; what does matter is whether the risk associated with any payment
or receipt is correlated with market risk factors that have associated risk premia. We
are not aware of any evidence of such a correlation. In the absence of any correlation,
the present value of any payment with purely idiosyncratic risk is calculated in terms of
the expected payment, discounted using a risk-free rate. The advantage of this rationale
in terms of USS is that it applies at the level of any individual scheme member, rather
than simply at the aggregate scheme level.
In contrast, the use of risk-free rates to calculate the present value of salary payments
is arguably less defensible on the basis of either rationale. While liabilities to any
individual scheme member are of fixed amounts, conditional upon mortality status,
salary payments are not fixed, either at the individual or aggregate level, even conditional
upon the scheme member being alive. To the extent that salaries are correlated with
standard measures of market risk that have associated risk premia (most obviously, stock
market risk) salary payments may have “positive beta”, which would imply a higher
discount rate than we use, and hence a lower present value than in our calculations (which
simply assume that salary payments follow a fixed, known, path until retirement). Thus
in the estimates of ∗ we provide below, this would point to these being under-estimates.
A crucial point to note is that the choice of discount rate in calculating the fair
contribution rate is entirely unaﬀected by the nature of the scheme’s investments. What
the scheme does with the contributions made by the scheme member will have a signif-
icant impact on risks to the scheme’s sponsors, but it does not aﬀect the present values
that feed into the contribution rate, so it does not aﬀect the contribution rate.12 It
would make a diﬀerence if the scheme’s commitments to members were contingent on
the outcome of investments, but they are not - indeed this is the key distinction between
12If this is not obvious, consider the answer to the question: what is the present value today of £100
invested in safe assets for ten years, compared to £100 invested in equities? The answer is the same in
both cases: £100.
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defined benefit schemes like USS and defined contribution schemes.
1.3.3 The impact of diﬀerent real interest rates
For a given choice of interest rates to calculate present values, we now turn to the impact
on the fair contribution rate.
In the conventional textbook case, when real interest rates are positive, the further
a payment is into the future, the less it is worth today, in real present value terms.
Since payments into the scheme come first, and the promised benefits stretch out into
the distant future, with positive real interest rates, for any given contribution rate, this
raises the present value of contributions relative to benefits. As a result, we show below
that a positive real interest rate means that the actual fair contribution rate ∗ can be
significantly lower than in the suitcase calculation.
Figure 2 shows that a commonly used measure of real interest rates, the yield on an
RPI-linked UK government bond with maturity of 10 years, was indeed typically positive,
albeit on a steadily declining trend, from 1985 until 2011, but has been consistently
negative since then.
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Figure 2: Yield on 10 Year RPI Indexed UK Government Bonds
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Since the obligations of the USS are now indexed to CPI inflation, in our calculations
below we adjust RPI-indexed yields for the gap between CPI and RPI inflation. This
makes the appropriate measure of real rates in recent years somewhat less than as shown
in the chart, but it is still currently markedly negative at all maturities.
When real rates are negative, as at present, the further a payment is into the future,
the more it is worth in present value terms, so ∗ needs to be higher than in the suitcase
calculation.
The impact on ∗ of quite small diﬀerences in the average level of interest rates
at diﬀerent maturities can be very significant. We show below that to a fairly good
approximation, when real interest rates are close to zero a one percentage point fall in
real rates raises the fair contribution rate ∗ by around 6 percentage points for someone
who contributes to the scheme for 20 years, and by 9 percentage points for someone who
contributes for 40 years.13 (This greater sensitivity for younger members reflects the
longer maturities of the scheme’s liabilities).
Thus even when we allow for the impact of real interest rates being diﬀerent from
zero, our suitcase calculation provides a crucial benchmark. For as long as real interest
rates remain negative, the fair contribution rate in the suitcase calculation, ∗ = 30%
represents a lower bound for the true contribution rate, ∗ But the extent to which
the true contribution rate diﬀers from ∗ is determined by the length of the period to
retirement. Thus the fair contribution rate is higher for younger scheme members.
A second look at Figure 2 also conveys a crucial message. The history of real interest
rates since 1985 gives no reassurance that real interest rates have any tendency to revert
to a stable average level.14 We have already seen, in Figure 1, that the other key
determinant of the fair rate, life expectancy at retirement, has also clearly drifted over
13We show below (see Section 3) that to a fairly good approximation the sensitivity to the real rate
is equal to ∗ times one half the current eﬀective life expectancy of the worker. We also show that this
can be related straightforwardly to the diﬀerence between the “durations” of the scheme’s liabilities vs
assets. Thus in our numerical example of someone who pays into the scheme for 40 years this coeﬃcient
is given by −030×¡40+222 ¢ = −93 for a unit change in yield, or −93 percentage points for a 1% change
in yield.
14This feature is borne out by long-run international data.
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time. Thus the fair contribution rate must clearly also vary over time; and in the recent
past at least, this drifting has clearly been in an upward direction.
1.4 The embedded life insurance policy
Our discussion thus far has focussed only on benefits paid after retirement. This ignores
the impact on the fair contribution rate of two elements of the scheme. First, as noted
under item 3 of the list of benefits at the start of the paper, whenever the scheme member
dies, the USS will pay to the surviving spouse, for the remainder of their lifetime, half of
the pension that would have been paid to the member, had they survived to retirement.
For those scheme members who die before retirement, the expected duration of the
spouse’s pension is clearly considerably higher, and hence the implied scheme liability is
distinctly higher. Second, as noted under item 4, the USS pays a death-in-service grant
of 3 times salary at the time of death. The total cash value of both of these benefits can
be viewed as is, in eﬀect, an embedded life insurance policy.15
In principle, it should be noted that some element of life insurance need not neces-
sarily aﬀect fair contribution rates. This can be illustrated by considering two specific
cases.
First consider a case in which the three post-retirement benefits we illustrated with
our suitcase calculation were the only benefits oﬀered by the scheme.16 In this case,
to the extent that some scheme members died before retirement, this would reduce the
scheme’s expected payouts, and we would therefore over-estimate the fair contribution
rate.
Now consider a second case in which, if the scheme member dies before retirement, the
USS pays the spouse’s pension from that date onwards, together with some additional
amount as a death-in-service grant. Both will push the actuarially fair contribution
15The cash value of the total payout would be equal to 3 years’ salary plus the cost of buying an
annuity equal to the spouse’s pension: the latter is likely to be the larger component.
16Specifically, if we assume that there was no death-in-service grant, and that the spouse’s pension was
only paid for as long as would be expected for a scheme member whose life expectancy after retirement
was as assumed above.
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rate back up again; and there will be some critical value of the death-in-service grant
at which the total costs of the insurance policy exactly counterbalance the savings on
post-retirement benefits, leaving the fair contribution rate unaﬀected.
Any value of the death-in-service grant larger than this critical value will of necessity
imply a higher fair contribution rate. We calculate below17 that, for virtually all scheme
members, the value of the death-in-service grant is higher than this critical value. For a
member with 20 years to retirement its net eﬀect is to boost the fair contribution rate
by around 1.6 percentage points.
1.5 A Summary of the Key Results of the Paper
In the remainder of the paper we set out a formal mathematical framework that allows
us to calculate estimates of the fair contribution rate, ∗, at prevailing market interest
rates, and given the typical pattern of life expectancy over life, as given by UK life
tables. While these calculations are complicated, the results are actually quite easy to
interpret in light of the arguments set out above, so we summarise them here.
Figure 3 shows the results of these calculations for scheme members joining the
scheme at the ages of 27 and 47, respectively, and hence having time to retirement of 40
and 20 years respectively. The calculation shows what would have been the hypothetical
required fair contribution rate over the period since 1985, for each of these individuals at
then-prevailing market interest rates and life expectancies, given the terms of the USS
scheme at the time. Thus the calculations also reflect the change in the scheme from
providing a pension which until 2011 was defined in relation to final salary to one based
on career average revalued earnings (CARE), as described above. A final salary scheme
implies that growth rate of earnings through the working life increases fair contribution
rates nontrivially, whereas in the current scheme the impact is minimal: thus a fair
contribution rate based on current scheme benefits would have been distinctly lower
before 2011.18 The estimates also take into account changes in UK-wide growth rates of
17See Table 7.
18See Section 3.3 below.
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real earnings,19 as well as the 2016 change in the annual accumulation rate from 1
80
to
1
75
. The table of results are given in Appendix A.
We should stress that, while the calculations involved are complicated, they are
conceptually fairly straightforward, require minimal assumptions and exploit readily
available data that would, to a very close approximation have been available in real
time.20 In particular the calculations do not require any assumptions about the future
path of interest rates, so there is no “look-ahead” bias. We do, of course, exploit the
market forecasts that are embedded in yields, and hence prices, of government bonds;
but when these prices change, our calculated fair contribution rate changes.
Figure 3: Actuarially Fair Contribution Rates (1985-2010)
Figure 3 shows that in the most recent data (as of August 2018) our estimated fair
contribution rates were just under 37% for a scheme member with 20 years to retirement,
and around 39% for a member with 40 years to retirement.
19We set the growth rate of earnings equal to 10 year rolling average annual growth rates (source:
ONS)
20The market yield curve data which largely drive short term movements are available on a daily
basis for the previous day; mortality statistics are available only with a lag of a year or two but evolve
only slowly so the calculations would be only minimally altered if we used data that would have been
available at the time.
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Despite the complexity of the underlying calculations, these figures are relatively
easy to interpret in terms of our analysis above. We showed above that if real interest
rates were zero at all maturities, the “suitcase” calculation would point to a fair contri-
bution rate of around 30%. But real rates across relevant maturities are currently all
negative, which implies that the suitcase calculation must understate the current fair
contribution rate. We also noted that if real interest rates across all maturities shift
away from zero by one percentage point this must, to a reasonable approximation, raise
the fair contribution rate by around 6 percentage points for a member with 20 years to
retirement, and by around 9 percentage points for a member with 40 years to retirement.
We show below that in the most recent data real rates at the (more relevant) longer ma-
turities (and adjusted for the expected gap between CPI and RPI inflation) are around
−09%. If, finally, we allow for the additional costs of the embedded insurance policy
(the death-in-service grant), which we estimate adds around 11
2
percentage points to the
fair contribution rate, we get very similar answers to those shown in the chart.
For example for a scheme member with 20 years to retirement:
Fair contribution rate
366% ≈ "suitcase" calculation30%
sensitivity to real interest rate−6 × real interest rate−09%
impact of death-in-service grant
+16%
For comparative purposes the chart also shows the actual historical contribution rate
for USS members. This shows that in the most recent data, there is a very substantial
gap between our estimated fair contribution rates and the current contribution rate.
What do we learn from these figures?
Probably the most immediately striking feature of our calculations is the very sub-
stantial gap between our estimated fair contribution rates and those in the current
scheme. It is not surprising, therefore, that the scheme’s sponsors have recently pro-
posed substantial increases in contribution rates.
However, we would argue that this is not the most crucial feature of our results. We
16
would lay more stress on the more general implications of our analysis. Most crucially,
we have shown that the fair contribution rate is, to a very good approximation, driven
by just two factors: life expectancy at retirement and the real interest rate. Both of
these factors share two key features.
First, as we have noted above, they have both tended to drift over time: in statistical
terms they are not mean-reverting. This in turn implies that the fair contribution rate
must itself drift over time;21 and Figure 3 showed that the implied shifts have been very
large. We show below that the dominant element in these shifts has been the path of
real interest rates: the secular downward trend in real rates shown in Figure 2 is largely
reflected in a secular upward trend in fair contribution rates.22
Second, and even more crucially, they are both exogenous processes, beyond the
control of anyone involved in the scheme. By implication, the same must apply to the
fair contribution rate itself.
Thus it is clear that any scheme based on a constant contribution rate must be
inherently unstable. This property is implicitly acknowledged in the periodic adjust-
ments of contribution rates seen historically, but such adjustments usually involve both
painful processes of negotiation and are also typically delayed responses to changes in
the underlying determinants.
At the time of writing (December 2018) negotiations are continuing between the
scheme’s sponsors and the trade unions who represent a substantial proportion of the
scheme members as to whether, and to what extent, the scheme should change. But
the logic of our analysis is that, if a pension scheme is to be viable, the associated
contribution rates that ensure this viability, for a given set of scheme benefits, are not
a fit subject for negotiation - any more than we expect to negotiate over the impact of,
say, the price of oil, or the impact of rising longevity on the price of life insurance. We
cannot negotiate away these features; all we can choose to negotiate over is the necessary
21Strictly speaking, in the absence of some fortuitous oﬀsetting movements in the two factors.
22We show below that the pattern of fair rates is also aﬀected nontrivially by shifts in the slope of
the yield curve.
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adjustments to the terms of agreements that are aﬀected by them. Thus we could in
principle neutralise, or at least oﬀset, the impact of further increases in longevity or
falls in market yields by some combination of higher contribution rates, reduced scheme
benefits and/or adjustments to the scheme’s retirement age. The precise combination of
adjustments could in principle be a subject of negotiation, but the requirement for an
adjustment is not.
While the primary focus of our analysis is on the determinants of fair contribution
rates for the “typical” scheme member, a further implication of our analysis is that no
such individual exists. While some individual features (most notably the initial salary
of the scheme member) have absolutely no impact on fair contribution rates, others,
most notably age (and hence time to retirement) only drop out of our formulae in re-
strictive cases (when real interest rates are zero at all maturities at the time of joining
the scheme); while yet others (marital status, gender, number of dependent children)
must always impact on fair contribution rates. As such, any scheme that sets a com-
mon contribution rate for all scheme members implies some element of cross-subsidy
across scheme members. Since the attributes that aﬀect fair contribution rates are typ-
ically eminently measurable, it is not immediately obvious why a common contribution
rate for scheme members with diﬀerent individual characteristics should necessarily be
desirable.23
Our analysis suggests that scheme contribution rates should vary both over time
(as exogenous determinants like interest rates and life expectancy vary) and across
individuals. While these conclusions may appear unpalatable, it is worth noting that, in
many other contexts, such variations are taken for granted. Arguably the most relevant
analogy is the market for annuities. Anyone purchasing an annuity will face a price
that varies from day to day, as interest rates vary, and also in secular terms as insurance
companies assess evidence on life expectancy. The price paid will also depend on a range
of personal characteristics - most notably, of course, age.
23The usual economic arguments for pooling apply only to unobservable characteristics such as health
and longevity risk.
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The clear diﬀerence between purchasing an annuity and being a member of a de-
fined benefit scheme is that the former is delivered by a reasonably transparent market,
whereas the latter is run by a set of administrative rules and procedures, changes in
which have in the past typically been both slow, and painful. But a further implica-
tion of our analysis is that regular adjustments of contribution rates to (best estimates
of) actuarially fair rates could in principle be entirely formulaic, with formulae based
on clear, implementable, and defensible principles. We would argue that our analysis
represents a useful first step in that direction.
1.6 A summary of the remainder of the paper
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we derive an expression for the
fair contribution rate based on a general market yield curve, an assumed deterministic
path for wages, and a hazard rate function that determines life expectancy at any given
age. While the yield curve and hazard rate functions are known at any point in time,
they will change over time, hence so must the fair contribution rate. In Section 3 we
consider a simplified example, with constant real yields and a known date of death,
and use this to derive a first-order Taylor Series approximation for the fair contribution
rate (which we exploit in the discussion above). In Section 4, we specify a particular
functional form for the market yield curve, consistent with the Vasicek model, which
allows us to consider subtler variants on the current market yield curve. In Section 5 we
use UK data to estimate fair contribution rates for a range of values of key determinants.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Fair Contribution Rate: a formal derivation
A scheme member joins a defined benefit pension scheme at time 0. If they survive, they
will retire at   0.
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2.1 The market environment
The scheme member’s real wage income , from which contributions to the scheme are
drawn, is assumed to grow deterministically at a constant continuously compounding
annual rate  ≥ 0. The wage 0 is normalised to 1 at  = 0, and therefore the wage at
time ,  = .
At time  there is a real market yield curve described by the function  () the
yield (continuously compounded risk-free real return to maturity) on a zero-coupon bond
issued at time , and maturing with a risk-free real payoﬀ at time . This function
evolves stochastically through time, but at any point  is a known deterministic function
in .
2.2 Mortality Risk
There is a single source of uncertainty, which is the time of death of the scheme member
and their spouse. The probability of death in a small interval ( +∆) is given by
 ()∆, where  () is the hazard rate (or the force of mortality). Denote by  (1 2)
the average hazard rate for period [1 2]. The probability of surviving from  = 0 until
 =  is then −  0 () = −(0 ) .24 We assume identical but independent probabilities
of death for the scheme member and spouse.25
2.3 The Scheme
The following assumption simplifies our analysis:
24Strictly speaking the hazard rate function is itself a function of time, ie  =  ()  Hence, anal-
ogously to the market yield curve, at any point in time  we assume there is a known probability
exp
¡− (  )¢ of surviving until time    but new information on mortality will cause this proba-
bility to adjust over time. We exploit such shifts in the hazard rate function in the numerical calculations
in Figure 3, but suppress the dependence on  in our notation for expositional purposes.
25In the data, as Figure 1 showed, they are clearly not identical, so the calculations below can also
be viewed as being calculated under a veil of ignorance on the gender of the scheme member. If we
calculated gender-specific fair contribution rates, these would clearly be higher for women than for men.
Anti-discrimination law rule this out in practice, but as a result a gender-neutral fair contribution rate,
as calculated below, clearly implies a cross-subsidy within the scheme from men to women.
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Assumption A1: The Law of Large numbers applies to all assets and liabilities of
the scheme.
Assumption A1 implies that idiosyncratic probabilities of death at any time  during
the life of the scheme translate to exact proportions of scheme participants, of any given
age, who die at time  While this is a standard assumption in calculating actuarially
fair magnitudes, we show below that our calculated fair contribution rate can also be
calculated under the alternative, and arguably less restrictive assumption that both
assets and contingent liabilities of the scheme have zero risk prices.
The scheme member’s instantaneous contribution to the pension scheme at time
 ∈ [0 ) is assumed to be a fixed time-invariant proportion  of their wage  at time
. The present value at  = 0 of the scheme member’s total payments into the scheme
0 (the assets of the fund) is simply proportional to the present value of the scheme
member’s lifetime earnings within the scheme, 0
0 = 0 (1)
where
0 =
Z 
0
(−(0)−(0)). (2)
Note that here, as in the remainder of the analysis we apply Assumption A1, such
that expected earnings of any individual scheme member of a given age, at a given time,
translate to the actual earnings of scheme members in aggregate of the same age and
time.
Note also that, because the wage is assumed to grow deterministically, this is the
only correction for risk required in the present value calculation. Thus, to the extent
that actual observed wage growth may covary with market risk factors, we ignore this.26
26To the extent that there is covariation between wage growth and market risk factors, we would
normally expect this to be positive. If so the value of 0 given here represents an upper bound to
the present value of the scheme member’s contributions. We also ignore the (empirically nontrivial)
probability that the scheme member may quit the scheme before retirement; however since this has
almost precisely oﬀsetting impacts on scheme assets and liabilities, allowing for this probability would
have a negligible impact on our results.
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In return for these contributions, the scheme member receives two kinds of payouts
if they survive beyond :
• A constant pension  payable from  until the scheme member’s death, given by
 = 
Z 
0
 = 
µ − 1

¶
(3)
where  is the annual accrual rate to pension for the years that they contribute to
the pension scheme (e.g. in the USS scheme  = 1
75
).
• A lump-sum payout at  =  of  years’ worth of the pension, i.e. of .
In addition the scheme also makes payments to spouses or other beneficiaries. There
are two kinds of payouts:
• If the scheme member dies before reaching retirement, the scheme makes a lump-
sum death-in-service payment to a named beneficiary of  times the annual wage
at the time of death,  ∈ [0 ), i.e.  . We assume that the scheme member
always names such a beneficiary.27
• Additionally, in the case that the scheme member dies before their spouse, the
spouse receives a proportion  of what the pension would have been, had the
scheme member survived until  (irrespective of whether the scheme member does
in fact die before ) i.e. the spouse receives  = 
³
−1

´
. We assume that
(in contrast with the death-in-service grant) any such payments can only be made
to the spouse, and thus any such payment is contingent on the spouse surviving
the scheme member.28.
27Note that in the current USS scheme  =  = 3
28In USS there are in practice some additional pension payments to dependent children but these are
of limited duration, and are discretionary, so we ignore them in our calculations.
22
2.4 The Fair Contribution Rate
Let 0 denote the present value of all the scheme’s contingent liabilities to the scheme
member. Define the fair contribution rate ∗ as the contribution rate that equates the
present values of the scheme’s assets and liabilities. Thus, given (1) and (2), we have
∗ = 00 (4)
The fair contribution rate is thus simply equal to the present value of the scheme’s
liabilities as a proportion of the present value of the scheme member’s lifetime earnings.
Note that we follow standard academic practice in ignoring the administrative costs of
the scheme in calculating this fair rate.
We now find the present values of each of the components of the scheme’s contingent
liabilities. Under Assumption A1, all such contingent liabilities, as outlined above, are
risk-free.
As stated, the scheme member receives an instantaneous pension  = 
³
−1

´
with
probability −(0) at time  ≥ . The present value of this pension payout stream is
then,
0 = 
µ − 1

¶Z ∞

−((0)+(0)) . (5)
The scheme member also receives a lump-sum payout of  at  = , which happens
with probability −(0). The present value of this at time 0 is
0 = 
µ − 1

¶
−((0)+(0)). (6)
The scheme pays a death-in-service grant equal to  =  if the scheme member
dies before retirement at   . This happens with probability −(0) ()∆ in the
period (   +∆). The present value of this lump-sum payout is
0 = 
Z 
0
 () (−(0)−(0)) . (7)
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Finally, when the scheme member dies at  , with probability −(0) if the scheme
member’s spouse is still alive, they will receive an instantaneous pension payout of

³
−1

´
until their death. Under our assumption this is true irrespective of whether
the scheme member dies before or after . The present value of this payout is,
0 =
Z ∞
0
 () −(0)
½

µ − 1

¶Z ∞

−((0)+(0))
¾
 . (8)
Here the integrals over  and  capture the probabilities of the scheme member’s and
spouse’s deaths, respectively at a given time horizon.
Thus we have
Proposition 1 The fair contribution rate ∗ is given by,
∗ = 1Z 
0
(−(0)−(0))| {z }
present value of earnings, 0
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
Z 
0
 () (−(0)−(0))| {z }
0 (death-in-service grant)
+ −((0)+(0))| {z }
0 (lump-sum)
(9)
+
Z ∞

−((0)+(0))| {z }
0 (pension to scheme member)
+ 
Z ∞
0
 () −(0)
½Z ∞

−((0)+(0))
¾
| {z }
0 (pension to surviving spouse)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
where  = 
µ − 1

¶
We immediately note that the expression for ∗ in Proposition 1 can be generalised.
Consider the following alternative to Assumption A1.
Assumption A2: Assume that all contingent payoﬀs of the scheme have zero risk
prices.
We then have
Corollary 1 Proposition 1 also holds, at the level of an individual scheme member, if
Assumption A1 is replaced with Assumption A2.
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Corollary 1 follows from standard asset pricing theory. If we abandon Assumption 1
and consider the nature of the payoﬀs underlying both the scheme’s assets, and liabilities
relating to an individual scheme member, these are clearly stochastic, due to mortality
risk. However if the payoﬀs are uncorrelated with market risk factors they will have
zero risk prices so the no-arbitrage prices of both assets and liabilities for an individual
scheme member can be calculated using expected payoﬀs, discounted by the risk-free
rate, resulting in an identical formula for ∗
2.5 Interest rate sensitivity of the fair contribution rate: a
duration-based approach
In the introduction we gave an intuitive argument for the impact of changes in real
interest rates on the fair contribution rate, ∗ The formula in Proposition 1 does not
make this relationship transparent. However, analysis of the durations (somewhat loosely
defined) of the scheme’s assets and liabilities brings this out more clearly and precisely.
Both assets and liabilities of the schemes can be interpreted as portfolios of zero
coupon bonds. Practitioners typically calculate the duration of a bond portfolio by
analysing the sensitivity to a parallel shift in the yields of all the bonds in the portfolio.
We take a similar approach here by considering the impact of a parallel shift in the zero
coupon yield curve. We decompose the zero coupon yield at any maturity  as
 () =  () +  () (10)
where  is the instantaneous rate (defined such that  () ≡  ( 0)) and  () is the
slope of the yield curve. We then have:
Proposition 2 Defining (spot rate) durations at  = 0 of the scheme’s assets (0 =
∗0) and scheme liabilities, 0 respectively by
 ≡ − ln00 ;  ≡ −
 ln0
0 ,
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the notional duration of ∗ is given by
∗ = − ln 
∗
0 =  −  . (11)
Then for ()  0 for  ∈ [0 ] and   −  0,
∗
0 = −
∗ ( −  )  0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition for this result is fairly straightforward. Since ∗ is simply the ratio of
liabilities to assets, its notional duration (the semi-elasticity with respect to the interest
rate) is simply equal to the diﬀerence between the two durations. Under minimal re-
strictions (which we show in Appendix B are satisfied for all plausible parameter values)
this diﬀerence must be positive, hence an upward parallel shift in the yield curve must
lower ∗
3 A simplified example and an approximation
3.1 A simplified example
To understand eqn (9) consider a special case under the following assumptions:
1. Deterministic time of death  for the scheme member, assumed after retirement:
  . The assumption means that we lose the term for the lump-sum payout if
the scheme member dies before .
2. The spouse outlives the scheme member with probability one half (given indepen-
dence), and, conditional upon surviving the scheme member, the spouse’s date of
death is given by   , with certainty.
3. The yield curve is flat, so that  () =  ∀
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Under these assumptions we have
∗ =

³
−1

´⎛
⎝
capitalisation factor for pensionn
−−−

o
+
capitalisation factor for spouse’s pension

2
×
n
−−−

o
+  ×
discount factor for lump sum©−ª
⎞
⎠
(−)−1
−
Wealth
.
(12)
The denominator of this expression is simply equal to0 the present value of lifetime
earnings. In the numerator the common term outside the brackets is simply the value of
the pension,  = 
³
−1

´
 The first two terms in curly brackets represent capitalisation
factors for the member’s and spouse’s pensions; the third term is simply a discount factor
for the lump sum payment.
Using this relatively simple expression we can obtain some simple and intuitive an-
alytical results.
We first consider a useful special case, which, as discussed in the introduction is not
too far from current data: namely we evaluate the limit of the fair contribution rate as
 approaches zero (noting that ∗ is undefined at this point). This gives, letting  = 1 
lim→0 
∗ =


where  is “eﬀective life expectancy at retirement”, defined by
 =  −+ 
2
¡ −¢+ 
since in this limiting case the capitalisation factor for the pension is simply equal to
 −  (the number of years the pension will be paid); the capitalisation factor for the
spouse’s pension is simply equal to 
2
¡ −¢ (the eﬀective number of additional years
the pension will be paid to the spouse, in expectation) and both enter symmetrically
with  the number of years’ extra pension provided as a lump sum. (This feature is
visible by inspection of the exact formula above).
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We thus find that this limiting case yields identical results to the “suitcase” calcu-
lation as set out in the introduction. Thus setting  = 3  = 1
2
(which are the current
parameters in the actual USS scheme) and assuming − = 18 − = 6 we then
have eﬀective life expectancy,  = 18 + 3 + 6
4
= 225 implying
lim→0 
∗ =
225
75
= 30%
as calculated above.
We also have
lim→0
∗
 = 0;
lim→0
∗
 = 0
The first result follows because in this limiting case a longer period of contributions
to the fund increases both fund assets and fund liabilities proportionally. The second
follows because in the absence of discounting the timing of salary payments, and hence
the growth rate of salaries, is irrelevant.
By taking the double limit as both  and  approach zero, and setting  =  = 0 for
expositional simplicity, we can also derive an intuitive expression for the limiting value
of the derivative with respect to 29 From Proposition 2, given the flat yield curve, we
have
∗
 = −
∗ ( −  )
and in this limiting case we have
lim→0→0  |==0 =

2
lim→0→0 |==0 = +

2
29We take the double limit for expositional simplicity. If we only take the limit as  → 0 the terms
below are all functions of  since higher values of  impact on duration of both assets and liabilities.
Non-zero values of  and  introduce some cross-product terms but qualitative results are similar.
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both of which features are fairly intuitive. With  constant and equal to 1, 0 = 
and duration of wealth at time zero is simply the average maturity of all wage payments,
given by 
2
. The duration of liabilities at  =  will be 
2
 but a zero coupon bond that
would provide this amount will have duration  at time zero, so its total duration is
+ 
2
 Hence
lim→0→0
∗
 |==0 = −


µ+
2
¶

or equivalently
lim→0→0 ∗|==0 ≡
 ln ∗
 =
+
2

i.e., in this doubly limiting case the notional duration of ∗ itself (the semi-elasticity
with respect to the interest rate) is equal to the duration of a zero coupon bond with
maturity +
2
, where + is life expectancy at time zero.
3.2 A linear approximation for the fair contribution rate
The doubly limiting case allows us to derive the first-order Taylor approximation to (12)
∗ ≈ ∗ = 
µ
1− (+)
2

¶
(13)
As is to be expected this provides a good approximation close to  =  = 0 but is
modestly biased downwards with respect to larger deviations of both  and  from zero,
as Figure 4 shows for a reasonably wide range of values of 
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Figure 4: (∗ brown, ∗ blue)
Note that the approximation has the feature
2∗
  0
For  = 225 as above, and e.g.,  = 40 we have
∗ ≈ 225
75
µ
1− 1
2
(40 + 225) 
¶
= 03− 938
so a one percentage point fall in  increases ∗ by roughly 9 percentage points in the
neighbourhood of  =  = 0
3.3 Comparison with a final salary scheme
Until 2011 for new members, and 2016 for all, the USS scheme provided a pension based
on final, rather than average salary. The simplified version of the model also allows a
straightforward comparison of the two approaches.
Inspection of the simplified expression (12) for ∗ above shows that it can be factored
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into three components as
∗ = 0 () =

³
−1

´
(−)−1
−
 ()
where  () is a weighted sum of the capitalisation and discount factors in curly brackets
in (12), that depend only on  By inspection, for  = 0 the terms in  in the ratio 0
cancel precisely, for any , implying the result that, as shown above, ∗ is near-invariant
to  for  close to zero.
In contrast, given our assumption on the wage process, a final salary scheme provides
a pension given by
 =  (14)
which implies that the associated fair contribution rate can be factored as
∗ = 0  () =

(−)−1
−
 () 
If  = 0 we then have

0 =

 − 1
which is a convex, increasing function of  The corresponding linear approximation in
the neighbourhood of  =  = 0 is given by
∗ ≈ 
µ
1 +
µ
2
¶
 −
µ+
2
¶

¶
so higher growth of earnings and a longer period to retirement interact to boost the fair
contribution rate in a final salary scheme.
3.4 The impact of early leavers
The calculation underpinning the formula for ∗ in Proposition 1 is predicated on the
apparently restrictive assumption that the scheme member will stay in the scheme, with
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certainty, until retirement at  =  However, it is straightforward to show that the
impact of this assumption is minimal, at least in the case of the simplified example.
Consider an extension to the example, in which the scheme member has a constant
probability  of quitting the scheme over the interval +∆ over a small interval ∆ If
the scheme member quits the scheme’s pension liability will be fixed at the level accrued
at the time they quit, but so will accrued assets. Thus the pension that will be paid is
now a random variable, and we now need to calculate liabilities in terms of the expected
pension, given by
0 () =
Z 
0
(−) = 
(−) − 1
 − 
At the same time the relevant measure of wealth, out of which contributions are accrued
also needs to be adjusted for the quit probability, so this becomes
0 = 
(−−) − 1
 −  − 
but we can immediately note that the formulae for 0 () and 0 are identical to those
for  and 0 calculated above if we replace  with e =  −  Since ∗ is near-invariant
to  for  close to zero, it must also be near-invariant to e and hence to 
4 The Actuarially Fair Contribution Rate with a Va-
sicek Model of the Yield Curve
We now extend the model by implementing the Vasicek model (1977) of the yield curve.
This allows us two extensions: (1) we can both extrapolate and interpolate market
yields where market data is not available,30 and (2) simulations of the actuarially fair
contribution rates under diﬀerent scenarios for the shape of the yield curve.
30We use yields form the Bank of England database, for which the maximum maturity is 40 years; at
various points yields are also missing at some intermediate maturities.
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The Vasicek model of the instantaneous rate  () is
 =  (− ) +  (15)
where  is the rate of mean reversion,  is the long-run mean interest rate,  is the rate’s
volatility and  ∼  (0 ). Integrating both sides, we have
 () = 0− +  ¡1− −¢+ − Z 
0
. (16)
This process in turn implies a particular function form for the market yield curve at
any time  which we can exploit in the definition of ∗ as follows:
Proposition 3 If the spot rate  () follows a Vasicek (1977) process, the actuarially
fair contribution rate ∗ is as given in Proposition 1, setting
 (0) = 0 + (1−

)e+ 24
µ

¶2
throughout, where e = lim→∞  (0) is given by
e = − 2
22
Proof. See Appendix C.
In Section 5 we calibrate the initial parameters (0   ) to match current market
zero coupon bond prices. In doing so, we show in Section 5 below that the resulting
estimate of the actuarially fair contribution rate ∗ is extremely close to that using the
full set of market yields. Having done this, we can then simulate the impact on ∗ of
shifts in the key Vasicek parameters.
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5 Numerical Estimates and Simulations
We apply UK data to estimate the actuarially fair contribution rates in Propositions 1
and 3. These are shown in Figure 3 in the introduction to the paper. For this,
• The hazard rate data for UK are published by the Oﬃce of National Statistics, for
which the latest data available are for 2015-17 (Appendix D).
• For interest rates, the Bank of England publishes the RPI instantaneous real zero
coupon yields and forward rates (https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/). The his-
torical year-end rates for 1985− 2017, as well as the rates for 10 August 2018 are
used in the following numerical simulations. In 2011 (Appendix E) USS changed
the inflation index used to adjust pension payouts from RPI to CPI. In line with
this, the historical real interest rates are also adjusted from 2011 using a RPI-CPI
wedge. For example a wedge of 83 is applied for the 30 August 2018 (see Ap-
pendix E for a discussion). The historical spot (0), 10-year (10) and 20-year (20)
CPI adjusted yields are depicted in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Real Yields (spot, 10-year and 20-year), 1985− 2010, RPI; 2011− 2017, CPI
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• The term structure of real yields for 20 August 2018 is shown in Figure 6. As
shown, real are currently negative at all maturities.
Figure 6: RPI and CPI Instantaneous Real Yields, 20 August 2018 (source: Bank of
England; RPI-CPI wedge estimated by authors)
• For the Vasicek model, parameters (  ) are calibrated to fit the yields of
zero coupon bonds  (0) given for 10 August 2018. This yields the values of
(0050 1291% 1086%). (Appendix F)
Note that  estimated here is the long-run mean of the instantaneous spot rate,
lim→∞ [ ()], where  () was given in (16). The long-run means for zero coupon
bond yields  (0), and the corresponding instantaneous forward returns  (0) =

 [ (0)], include a convexity term, such that lim→∞  (0) = lim→∞  (0) =e, where e =  − 2
22 . The calibrated value of e on the market yield data used here is
−1088%. (See Appendix F for further discussion.)
5.1 Calculating historical Fair Contribution Rates
The actuarially fair contribution rates in Proposition 1 are computed and plotted in
Figure 3, in the introduction to this paper, using the year-end real instantaneous forward
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rates (and the CPI-adjusted rates from 2011), and hazard rate data as described above.
Two cases are shown, where the worker joins the pension scheme at the ages of 47 and
27, where the retirement age is assumed to be 67, hence  = 20 or 40. Before 2011,
when the scheme defined the pension in relation to final salary, the expression for  in
(3) is replaced with  =  as in (14).  is set as 180 and 175 for up to 2015 and 2016
and after, respectively.
Also plotted are the historical USS contribution rates (employees and employers
combined). The breakdown between the employees and employers are given in Appendix
A.
5.2 Fair Contribution Rates using Market Yields and Counter-
factual Vasicek Parameters
Using the interest rates for 10 August 2018, the fair contribution rates in Propositions
1 and 3 are estimated and compared for  = 0%:
Years in Scheme Market Forward Rates Vasicek Model
20 368% 368%
40 393% 392%
(Table 1)
The comparison makes clear that the Vasicek model allows suﬃcient flexibility in the
calibrated parameters to give virtually identical results to those calculated using the full
set of market forward rates/yields.
We can also compare the eﬀects of a change in the wage growth rate  on the fair
contribution rate for 20 and 40 years of contributions, using market yields:
 0% 1% 2% 3% 4%
20 years in scheme 368% 366% 364% 363% 361%
40 years in scheme 392% 389% 386% 383% 380%
(Table 2)
This demonstrates that ∗ is relatively small and negative. This is consistent with our
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simplified analytical example, with  =  = 0 where we have sign
³
∗

´
=sign() 
The Vasicek model allows us to analyse diﬀerent scenarios for the crucial model
parameters.
We first consider the impact of a shift in  the implied mean of the instantaneous
spot rate in the Vasicek model. We represent the impact in terms of a shift in the
limiting value of the yield and forward curve, e =  − 2
22 , since this magnitude is
directly comparable with market yields. For  = 0 we have
e −30% −20% −10% 00% 10% 20% 30%
20 years in scheme 466% 411% 364% 323% 289% 259% 233%
40 years in scheme 606% 482% 384% 307% 246% 197% 159%
(Table 3)
This demonstrates that, compared to the current Vasicek estimate of e = −1088%, the
long-run mean rate would need to rise to between 0 − 1% if workers contribute for 40
years, and to nearly 2% if they only contribute for 20 years, in order for the current
aggregate contribution rate of 26% to be actuarially fair.
Note that in this initial exercise the current interest rate 0 is kept fixed while the
long-run mean rate is shifted, in eﬀect rotating the yield curve pivoted at 0. In Table
4 we instead simulate parallel-shifts in the yield curve:
0 −34% −24% −14% −04% 06% 16% 26%e −30% −20% −10% 00% 10% 20% 30%
20 years in scheme 537% 439% 361% 299% 248% 207% 173%
Implied “duration” − 200 195 190 185 180 175
40 years in scheme 677% 510% 382% 285% 212% 157% 116%
Implied “duration” − 289 293 298 302 305 307
(Table 4)
The implied duration figures shown here have a direct correspondence to the defi-
nition of (spot rate) durations applied in Proposition 2, expressed in terms of discrete
changes. Thus the implied durations for ∗ are approximately given here by the change
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in ln ∗ moving right across the table (since yields at all maturities are shifting by one
percentage point). These correspond quite well to the implied figures for ∗ given by
our linear approximation for ∗ in Section 3, which implies ∗ ≈ +2 for  close to zero.
For higher values of ∗ the notional duration falls oﬀ, given the convexity of the true
function for ∗
With such high implied durations for ∗ it is unsurprising that the range of diﬀerent
values of ∗ is wide, and highly sensitive to real interest rates. To illustrate the impact
of diﬀerent input values, in Table 5 we simulate the fair contribution rates for diﬀerent
hypothetical yield curves depicted in Figure 7 using hazard rates for 10 August 2018. To
show the impact of diﬀerent hazard rate functions, in Table 6 we recompute the numbers
in Table 5 using the hazard rates for 1985 (see Figure 8).
  Up ( 0) Flat ( 0) Down ( 0) Up ( 0) Flat ( 0) Down ( 0)
20 0% 340% 384% 437% 236% 263% 295%
20 2% 337% 380% 431% 237% 264% 296%
40 0% 322% 410% 524% 180% 230% 293%
40 2% 320% 401% 504% 189% 237% 297%
(Table 5: Impact of diﬀerent yield curve shapes given latest mortality data.)
  Up ( 0) Flat ( 0) Down ( 0) Up ( 0) Flat ( 0) Down ( 0)
20 0% 285% 314% 348% 209% 228% 250%
20 2% 285% 314% 346% 212% 231% 252%
40 0% 258% 321% 399% 152% 189% 235%
40 2% 261% 318% 389% 162% 198% 242%
(Table 6: Impact of diﬀerent yield curve shapes given mortality data for 1985.)
Tables 5 and 6 show that:
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1. The higher the long-run yield, the lower the fair contribution rate.
2. For downward ( 0) where the long-run yield is 0%, the fair contribution rate is
insensitive to changes in  or .
3. The fair contribution rates are lower for longer  if the yields are negative, while
they are higher for positive yields.
4. The increase in hazard rates since 1985 (i.e. longer life expectancy) have increased
the fair contribution rate, with the increase being larger for longer , lower  and
negative yields.
Figure 7: Diﬀerent Yield Curve used for Simulation
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Figure 8: Hazard Rates for 1985 and 2017
Finally, we investigate the relative importance of the four payout terms in Proposition
1, i.e. the contribution rate required to cover (i) the lump-sum payout to the beneficiary
if the worker dies before , (ii) the lump-sum payout to the worker at , (iii) the pension
payout to the worker from  until their death, and (iv) the pension payments to the
spouse if they outlive the worker. For a 20 year contribution and  = 0, we have
e −30% −20% −10% 00% 10% 20% 30%
Lump-sum if die before  17% 17% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%
Lump-sum to worker at  44% 42% 40% 38% 37% 35% 33%
Pension payout to worker 336% 293% 256% 225% 198% 175% 155%
Pension payout to spouse 70% 60% 51% 44% 38% 33% 29%
Total 466% 411% 364% 323% 289% 259% 233%
(Table 7)
Unsurprisingly the pension payout to the worker is the largest element (around 70% of
the total payout). The relative weight of the three remaining terms corresponds reason-
ably well to their respective contributions to “eﬀective life expectancy”, as discussed in
Section 3 in relation to our simplified example. The only exception is that the contribu-
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tion of the spouse’s pension is distinctly higher, since the calculations in that discussion
only relate to benefits payable after retirement.
6 Concluding Remarks
Since we summarise the key conclusions of the paper in the Introduction, we do not
repeat them here; we focus instead on some qualifications, and possible objections, to
our modelling approach.
Clearly, even in our more complicated calculations described below, we have made
important simplifications. If anything, however, we would argue that allowing for these
would increase, rather than decrease our estimates of typical fair contribution rates.
Specifically:
• We treat wage growth as if it had no risk associated with it. This has two important
eﬀects on our calculations. First, ∗ is assumed constant throughout the scheme
member’s working life. If, for example, the member’s salary rises unexpectedly
above or below what was factored into the original ∗ calculation, the scheme
cannot change its contribution rate on these higher contributions. But by the time
they occur market interest rates may have changed, implying a diﬀerent value of
∗. This means that the scheme carries interest rate risk - it is in eﬀect providing
a free option to members. Second, to the extent that wage growth is correlated
with market returns, it has “positive beta”, which means that the present value of
contributions is less than that implied by the calculation using yields on risk-free
bonds.
• We make no adjustment for the transactions costs of running the scheme.
• We do not attempt to extrapolate the steady rise in life expectancy observed in
the data.
• Nor do we take account of any statistical evidence of links between life expectancy
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and socioeconomic factors, which would almost certainly point to USS members
having higher life expectancies than the average population.
As against these arguments, a counter-argument that is often proposed is that the
contributions scheme members invest in the scheme can be (and indeed typically have
been) invested in risky assets with higher expected returns than those on risk-free bonds.
We would argue strongly that this argument is mistaken. Our calculations are based
purely on present value calculations that only require us to know the properties of
contributions into, and contingent liabilities of, the scheme. These are invariant to the
scheme’s investment strategy, and thus the investment strategy has no impact on fair
contribution rates.
We could of course imagine a scheme that would not have this invariance property;
but it would not be a defined benefit scheme. Thus, at the opposite extreme, in a pure
defined contribution scheme the liabilities of the scheme are entirely determined by the
investment strategy.
It is possible, in principle, to imagine a hybrid scheme in which liabilities were not
risk-free (contingent on the scheme member’s mortality status), but instead had some
form of explicit dependence on investment returns.31 To the extent that liabilities in
such a scheme then had “positive beta” with respect to market risk factors, which in
turn had positive market risk premia, this would straightforwardly imply a lower fair
contribution rate, albeit at the cost of a riskier income in retirement. However even such
a hybrid scheme would almost certainly share the key characteristics we have stressed
throughout the paper, that fair contribution rates would be increasing in life expectancy
and decreasing in expected investment returns. Thus even such a hybrid scheme would
face the same inherent instability as a pure defined benefit scheme like USS if contri-
bution rates were held fixed. Furthermore there would be a sharp contrast with the
relatively straightforward calculation of fair contribution rates presented in this paper,
which require only information which is readily available on a virtually real-time basis.
31Indeed some attempts have been made to develop such hybirid schemes, see, for example, Munnell
& Sass (2013).
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Calculation of fair contribution rates for such hybrid schemes would be both consider-
ably more complex, and distinctly more contentious, since it would require assumptions
on expected market returns and risk premia, all of which are the subject of extensive
debate and continued disagreement, both amongst academics and practitioners.
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7 Appendix
A Historical USS and Simulated Fair Contribution
Rates
The historical USS contribution rates for employees and employers are sourced from
Wikipedia. The period between 1974 and 1997 includes a 2% surcharge aimed at covering
benefits for service prior to the scheme’s inception in 1974. Between 2011 and 2016 the
employee contribution rate was 75% for existing workers with final salary scheme and
635% for new workers with career average revalued earnings (CARE).
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Table 8: Fair and USS Actual Contribution Rates
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B Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. (11) follows immediately from the definition:
∗ = 00 ⇒−
 ln ∗
0 = −
1
∗
∗
0 = −
µ ln0
0 −
 ln0
0
¶
=  −  .
For the sign of ∗, recall 0 is,
0 = 
Z 
0
 () (−(0)−(0)) + 
Z ∞
0
 () −(0)
½Z ∞

−((0)+(0))
¾

+−((0)+(0)) + 
Z ∞

−((0)+(0))
= 0 + 0 + 0 + 0.
Then  is a weighted average of the duration of its components:
 = 

0
0  +
0
0  +
0
0  +
0
0  . (17)
Compare this with  . Note first that,
 = 10
Z 
0
(−(0)−(0))  10
Z 
0
(−(0)−(0)) = 100 = 
as  ∈ [0 ] in the integrand. Analogously for the latter two terms of (17),
 = 1
−((0)+(0)) =
1

 = 
 = 1
Z ∞

−((0)+(0))  1
Z ∞

−((0)+(0)) = 1
 = 
i.e. both terms are greater than or equal to  . As for the first term in (17),
 = 1
Z 
0
 () (−(0)−(0)) =
R 
0
 () (−(0)−(0))R 
0
 () (−(0)−(0)) =
Z 
0
 () 
(18)
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where
 () =  () 
(−(0)−(0))R 
0
 () (−(0)−(0)) .
In other words  is a weighted average of the times of death-in-service payouts  ,
 ∈ [0 ], with the weights given by  (). Compare this with
 =
R 
0
(−(0)−(0))R 
0
(−(0)−(0)) =
Z 
0
 ()  (19)
where
 () = 
(−(0)−(0))R 
0
(−(0)−(0)) .
Note for constant  () =  ∀ ,  () =  (). Then for ()  0,  () gives
higher weights to larger  than  (), and hence    . This leaves the second
term in (17),
 = 0
Z ∞
0
 () −(0)
½Z ∞

−((0)+(0))
¾
 =
R∞
0
 () −(0)
nR∞
 −((0)+(0))
o
R∞
0
 () −(0)
nR∞
 −((0)+(0))
o

.
This can be rewritten as,
 =
R∞
0
−((0)+(0))
nR 
0
 () −(0)
o
R∞
0
−((0)+(0))
nR 
0
 () −(0)
o

.
In splitting  into two,
 = 

0
0 
 +
≥0
0 
≥
where
0 = 
Z ∞
0
−((0)+(0))
½Z 
0
 () −(0)
¾

= 
Z 
0
−((0)+(0))
½Z 
0
 () −(0)
¾
+ 
Z ∞

−((0)+(0))
½Z 
0
 () −(0)
¾

= 0 + ≥0 ,
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once again it can be seen that,
≥ =
1
≥0
Z ∞

−((0)+(0))
½Z 
0
 () −(0)
¾

 1≥0
Z ∞

−((0)+(0))
½Z 
0
 () −(0)
¾
 = 1≥0 
≥
0 = .
Finally for
 =
R 
0
−((0)+(0))
nR 
0
 () −(0)
o
R 
0
−((0)+(0))
nR 
0
 () −(0)
o

to be greater than  in (19), the suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition is that 
grows more slowly than
R 
0
 () −(0) (again such that larger weights are assigned
to larger  in  than in  ), or that  is less than some critical value − such that
 =  (−).
We note that ()  0 for working age for all historical data attained from ONS
(1982 − 2017), and similarly that    comfortably for an extremely wide range
of values for .
C Proof of Proposition 3
Analogous to (2), the expectation of the present value of the scheme member’s lifetime
earnings within the scheme is now
0 = b0 ∙Z 
0
(−(0))−  0 
¸
, (20)
where b0 [ ] is the risk-neutral expectation over stochastic  taken at  = 0. Similarly
the expectation of the total present value of the scheme member’s pension payouts is,
0 = b0 ∙ Z 
0
 () (−(0))−  0  + −(0)− 0  (21)
+
Z ∞

−(0)−  0  + 
Z ∞
0
 () −(0)
½Z ∞

−(0)−  0 
¾

¸
,
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where  is given by (9).
As before ∗ is given by 00 , where, from (20) and (21),
0 =
Z 
0
(−(0)) b0 h−  0 i 
0 = 
Z 
0
 () (−(0)) b0 h−  0 i  + (−(0)) b0 h− 0 i
+
Z ∞

−(0) b0 h−  0 i  + Z ∞
0
 () −(0)
½Z ∞

−(0) b0 h−  0 i ¾  ,
where the price of a zero coupon bond with maturity  at  = 0 is
 (0 ) = b0 h−  0 i .
To find the expression for this substitute from the Vasicek model (16),
 (0 ) = exp
½
−
Z 
0
¡0− +  ¡1− −¢¢ ¾ b0 ∙exp½−Z 
0
µ
−
Z 
0

¶

¾¸
= exp
½
−− (0 − ) 1− 
−

¾ b0 ∙exp½−Z 
0
µ
−
Z 
0

¶

¾¸
.
Consider the term b0 []. Noting that for a stochastic variable  with b0 [] = 0,b0 £¤ =  12 [], we have,
b0 ∙exp½−Z 
0
µ
−
Z 
0

¶

¾¸
= exp
½2
2
 
∙Z 
0
µ
−
Z 
0

¶

¸¾
.
Now,
 
∙Z 
0
µ
−
Z 
0

¶

¸
=
Z 
0
Z 
0

∙
−
Z 
0
 −
Z 
0

¸

=
Z 
0
Z 
0
−(+) b0 ∙Z 
0

Z 
0

¸

=
Z 
0
Z 
0
−(+)
µZ ∧
0
2
¶

=
1
2
Z 
0
Z 
0
−(+) ¡2(∧) − 1¢ ,
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where  ∧  = min [ ]. Continuing,
=
1
2
Z 
0
∙Z 
0
−(+) ¡2 − 1¢ ¸  + 1
2
Z 
0
∙Z 

−(+) ¡2 − 1¢ ¸ 
=
1
22
Z 
0
¡
1 + −2 − 2−¢  + 1
22
Z 
0
¡−−(−) + −(+) + 1− −2¢ 
=
1
23
¡
2− 3 + 4− − −2¢ .
Thus,
 (0 ) = exp
½
−− (0 − ) 1− 
−
 +
2
43
¡
2− 3 + 4− − −2¢¾
= exp
(
−0
µ
1− −

¶
+
µ
− 
2
22
¶µ
1− −
 − 
¶
− 
2
4
µ
1− −

¶2)
=  (0 ) exp {− (0 ) 0} . (22)
where
 (0 ) = exp
½µ
− 
2
22
¶
( (0 )− )− 
2
4 (0 )
2
¾
(23)
 (0 ) = 1− 
−
 . (24)
If we then define
 (0) = −(0)
we then have
 (0) = 0 + (1−

)e+ 24
µ

¶2
as given in the proposition. ¥
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D Hazard Rates
The Oﬃce of National Statistics releases the national life table (source: https://www.ons.gov.uk/).
The mortality rate using the data for 2015-17 is shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9: UK mortality rate, 2015-17 (source: ONS)
Using these data the average age of death can be calculated as 792 years for male, 829
years for female and 81 years for the whole population.
E UK Real Yields and Forward Rates
The Bank of England publishes real yields and instantaneous forward rates for RPI
inflation
(https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/yield-curves/) for years 25 to 40. As of 10
August 2018 these rates are negative as shown in Figure 2. As USS changed the inflation
index applied to adjust pension payouts from RPI and CPI in 2011, it is necessary to
adjust this to real rates reflecting CPI. To do this the RPI-CPI wedge is estimated using
a 20 year rolling average. The wedge applied is between 52 and 92, with 82 for the
most recent data (August 2018).
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Figure 10: RPI - CPI Wedge and 20 year Rolling Average
This contrasts with the “long-run average diﬀerence between RPI and CPI inflation” of
80 applied in Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (2006), or the statement in their
StaﬀWorking Paper No.551 (2015) that, “[o]ver longer horizons, the expected RPI/CPI
wedge appears fairly stable at around 66 basis points”. On the other hand, OBR (2015)
quote their “new estimate of the long-run wedge between RPI and CPI inflation of
10 percentage points”. Our estimate of 82 for the most recent data lies within the
appropriate range of these estimates.
F Vasicek Parameter Estimation
Given the market price of zero coupon bonds with maturity ,  (0 ), the Vasicek
parameters (  ) were calibrated to minimised the following error function,
min
()
X

[ (0 )− (0 )]2 ,
where  (0 ) is given by Eqn (22). For 10 August 2018, this resulted in the estimates
(0050 1291% 1086%). In the Vasicek model, the future interest rates have the expec-
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tation of,
 [ ()] = 0− +  ¡1− −¢ ,
which is derived by taking the expectation of Eqn (16). On the other hand, the forward
rates seen at time 0 includes a convexity term:
 (0 ) = 0− +  ¡1− −¢− 2
22
¡
1− −¢2 .
In other words the market forward rate curve is lower than the path of future spot rates
estimated by the model by the convexity term,
 (0 ) =  [ ()]− 
2
22
¡
1− −¢2 . (25)
The reason for this is because bond prices are convex in rates, which means that the
average price is higher than the price at the average rate (Jensen’s inequality applied to
convex functions), or equivalently, the average bond returns are lower than the average
rate by the convexity term. Specifically, the average bond return is,
 (0 ) = −1 ln (0 ) = −
1
 ln (0 ) +
1
  (0 ) 0.
In the limit then,
lim→0 (0 ) = 0 and lim→∞ (0 ) = e, where e = − 222 .
Figure 11 shows the calibrated forward curve fitting closely with the market forward
curve. The diﬀerence between the  [] curve and the fitted forward curve is the con-
vexity term 2
22 (1− −)2 in (25).
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Figure 11: Market and Vasicek-fitted Real (CPI) Instantaneous Forward Rates, 10
August 2018
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